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Abstract
Deep computer vision systems being vulnerable to im-
perceptible and carefully crafted noise have raised ques-
tions regarding the robustness of their decisions. We take
a step back and approach this problem from an orthogonal
direction. We propose to enable black-box neural networks
to justify their reasoning both for clean and for adversarial
examples by leveraging attributes, i.e. visually discrimina-
tive properties of objects. We rank attributes based on their
class relevance, i.e. how the classification decision changes
when the input is visually slightly perturbed, as well as im-
age relevance, i.e. how well the attributes can be local-
ized on both clean and perturbed images. We present com-
prehensive experiments for attribute prediction, adversar-
ial example generation, adversarially robust learning, and
their qualitative and quantitative analysis using predicted
attributes on three benchmark datasets.
1. Introduction
Deep neural networks, despite their good performance in
classification [21, 33, 17, 37], can be easily fooled by adver-
sarial examples, i.e. added imperceptible noise not visible
to humans [41, 7, 5, 39]. Understanding why this happens
is of major curiosity. Previous research has provided in-
sights about deep learning frameworks [39], the geometry
of their class boundaries [41, 30, 15] and the geometry of
data manifold [14] which have led to a number of detection
and defense methods [26, 27, 44]. However, none of them
have yet succeeded completely to rectify, detect, or create a
defense against adversarial examples. In this work, we take
a step back and propose to understand why a deep network
is fooled by adversarial examples.
Interpreting deep neural network decisions helps in un-
derstanding their internal functioning and could be used for
detecting and creating defenses against adversarial attacks
[43, 10]. This indirectly provides a way to revisit the de-
cision maker in its failure mode [45]. Previously instance
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Figure 1: Our interpretable attribute prediction-grounding
framework provides visual evidence for a clean image that
gets embedded close to the correct blue class (painted
bunting) because of “red belly” and “blue head” attributes,
and for an adversarial image that gets embedded close to
the incorrect red class (herring gull) as the network thought
there were “white belly” and “white head” attributes.
level visual interpretations, e.g. either adding perturbations
to the input or by taking the gradient of output with respect
to its input [35, 12], have been used to introspect deep neu-
ral networks. However, [49, 1] showed that they do not ac-
curately capture the attacks to input generation process and
models (see a visual example in Figure 2).
In this paper, we propose an alternative visual interpre-
tation technique using visually discriminative properties of
the objects, i.e. attributes, that are predicted and grounded
on clean and adversarial examples. To predict attributes,
we learn a mapping from image feature space into class
attribute space. Thanks to the ranking based learning, we
observe that clean images get mapped close to the cor-
rect class while adversarial images get mapped closer to
a wrong class embedding. For instance, as shown in Fig-
ure 1, “blue head” and ”red belly” associated with the class
“painted bunting” are predicted correctly for the clean im-
age. On the other hand, due to predicting attributes incor-
rectly as “white belly” and “white head”, the adversarial
image gets classified into “herring gull” incorrectly. Note
1
ar
X
iv
:1
90
4.
08
27
9v
1 
 [c
s.C
V]
  1
7 A
pr
 20
19
that, we consider adversarial examples that are generated
to fool only the classifier and not the interpretation mecha-
nism. To ground attributes, we adapt state of the art deep ob-
ject/object part detector, i.e. Faster-RCNN, to detect bound-
ing boxes around the visual evidence of our predicted at-
tributes. Finally, our analysis involves studying adversari-
ally robust models, i.e. using adversarial training as a de-
fense technique against adversarial attacks.
Our main contributions are as follows: (1) We propose to
understand the neural network decisions for adversarial ex-
amples by learning to predict visually discriminative class-
specific attributes. (2) We visualize the predicted attributes
by grounding them on their respective images, i.e. drawing
bounding boxes around their visual evidence on the image.
(3) We interpret adversarial examples of standard and ad-
versarially robust framework in three benchmark attribute
datasets with varying size and granularity.
2. Related Work
In this section, we discuss related works on adversarial
examples and interpretability research prior to ours.
Adversarial Examples. Small carefully crafted perturba-
tions, i.e. adversarial perturbations, added to the inputs of
deep neural networks, i.e. adversarial examples, can easily
fool the classifiers trained using deep learning [41]. Such
attacks involve iterative fast gradient sign method [22],
Jacobian-based saliency map attacks [31], one pixel attacks
[40], Carlini and Wagner attacks [6] and universal attacks
[29] designed not only for classificaton but for object de-
tection [47], segmentation [11], auto encoders [42], genera-
tive models [20], and reinforcement learning [24]. Most of
these perturbations are transferable between different net-
works and do not require access to the network’s architec-
ture or parameters, i.e. black box attacks.
Concurrently many attempts have been made for under-
standing, detecting and defense against these attacks. The
reason behind adversarial examples may be the linearity in
neural networks [41] or low probability adversarial pockets
in image space [15]. Neural networks respond to recurrent
discriminative patches [7] whereas adversarial examples lie
in a different region on the data manifold [14]. Hence, sev-
eral methods have been proposed to detect adversarial ex-
amples [26, 27]. On the other hand, ensemble adversar-
ial training [44],deep contractive networks [16], defensive
distillation [31], protection against adversarial attacks using
generative models [34][36] focuses on the defense against
adversarial attacks. In this work, our aim is to understand
the sources and causes of misclassification when the neural
network is presented with an adversarial example.
Interpretability. Explaining the output of a decision maker
is necessary to build user trust before deploying them into
the real world environment, e.g. in applications like finance,
autonomous vehicles, and medical imaging etc. Previous
work is broadly grouped into two: 1) model interpreta-
tion, i.e. understanding of model by observing the struc-
ture, parameters and neuronal activities of the networks and
2) instance level interpretation or prediction explanation,
i.e. showing the causal relationship between input and the
specific output [9]. De-convolutional neural networks [48]
and activation maximization [38] fall under the first group.
On the other hand, visualizing the evidence for classifica-
tion [51], adding perturbation in the optimization frame-
work and learning the perturbation mask to understand the
contribution of features [12] lie in the second group. As
an alternative to visualizations, text-based class discrimi-
native explanations [18, 32] and text-based interpretation
with semantic information [8] have also been proposed to
explain network decisions. In this work, we use attributes
as a means of prediction explanation.
Interpretability of Adversarial Examples. After analyz-
ing neuronal activations of the networks for adversarial ex-
amples, [7] concluded that the networks learn recurrent dis-
criminative parts of objects instead of semantic meaning.
In [19], the authors proposed a datapath visualization mod-
ule consisting of the layer level, feature level, and the neu-
ronal level visualizations of the network for clean as well as
adversarial images. Finally, in [43], the authors proposed
an attribute steered classification model and compared its
output with a standard classifier. If outputs were inconsis-
tent then the image was detected as an adversarial image.
They further argued that the interpretation is closely entan-
gled with the detection. Saliency-based model interpreta-
tions has been shown to be fragile to interpret adversarial
examples [13], i.e. although the output of the neural net-
work for two inputs is different the saliency maps are iden-
tical. Similarly, in [49], authors proposed ACID attacks
which change the output of saliency maps without chang-
ing the output of the classifier. In [1], authors performed
sanity checks on saliency-based methods using randomiza-
tion tests and found that they do not vary with the change in
the data generation process and the model. In our work, we
propose to ground class-discriminative attributes via bound-
ing boxes that explain class predictions for clean as well as
adversarial examples.
3. Predicting and Grounding Attributes Model
Instance level interpretations such as saliency maps [35]
are often weak in justifying classification decisions for fine-
grained adversarial images, e.g. in Figure 2 the saliency
maps of a clean image classified into the correct class, e.g.
“red winged blackbird”, and the saliency map of a misclas-
sified adversarial image, look quite similar. Instead, we pro-
pose to predict and ground attributes for both clean and ad-
versarial images to provide visual as well as attribute-based
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Figure 2: Adversarial images are difficult to explain: when
the answer is wrong, often saliency based methods (left) fail
to detect what went wrong. Instead, attributes (right) pro-
vide intuitive and effective visual and textual explanations.
interpretations. In fact, our predicted attributes predicted
for clean and adversarial images look quite different. By
grounding the predicted attributes one can infer that “or-
ange wing” is important for “red winged blackbird” while
“red head” is important for “red faced cormorant”. Indeed,
when the attribute value for orange wing decreases and red
head increases the image gets misclassified.
In this section, we detail our two-step framework for in-
terpreting adversarial examples. First, we perturb the im-
ages using two different untargeted/targeted adversarial at-
tack methods and robustify the classifiers via adversarial
training. Second, we predict class-specific attributes and
visually ground them on the image to provide an intuitive
justification of why an image is classified as a certain class.
3.1. Adversarial Attacks
We study both untargeted and targeted attacks. Given
an original input xn and its respective correct class yn pre-
dicted by a model f(xn), an untargeted adversarial attack
model generates an image xˆn for which the predicted class
is f(xˆn) 6= yn. In targeted attacks, for every image xˆn,
the the adversary aims at letting the model predict a specific
yt 6= yn. In the following, we detail an adversarial attack
method fooling a softmax classifier and an adversarial train-
ing technique that robustifies it.
IFGSM. The iterative fast gradient sign method [22] is a
modification of fast gradient sign method (FGSM) [15]. In
IFGSM, FGSM is applied iteratively solving the objective
function to produce adversarial examples:
xˆ0 = xn
xˆi+1n = Clip{xˆin + αSign(5xˆinJ(xˆin, yn))} (1)
where 5xˆinJ represents the gradient of the cost function
w.r.t. perturbed image xˆin at step i. α determines the step
size which is taken in the direction of sign gradient and fi-
nally, the result is clipped by epsilon Clip.
Adversarial Training. As a defense against adversarial at-
tacks [15] adversarial training minimizes the objective:
Jadv(θ(xn), yn) = αJ(θ(xn), yn)
+ (1− α)J(θ(xˆn), y) (2)
where, θ(xn) are input image features, J(θ(xn), yn) is the
classification loss for clean images, J(θ(xˆn), y) is the loss
for adversarial images and α regulates the loss to be min-
imized. The model finds the worst case perturbations and
fine tunes the network parameters to reduce the loss on per-
turbed inputs. Hence, the classification accuracy on adver-
sarial images increases, however there is trade-off between
the accuracy of the predictions in clean and adversarial im-
ages. Adversarial training helps in learning more robust
classifiers by suppressing the perturbations from adversarial
images [45]. Further, it is also considered as a regulariza-
tion technique [28].
3.2. Attribute Prediction and Grounding
Our attribute prediction and grounding model uses at-
tributes as side information to define a joint embedding
space that the images are mapped to. In this space, at-
tributes act as side information to interpret the classifi-
cation decision. As shown in Fig.3, during training our
model maps clean training images close to their respective
class attributes, e.g. “painted bunting” with attributes “red
belly, blue head, black bill”, whereas adversarial images get
mapped close to a wrong class, e.g. “herring gull” with at-
tributes “white belly, white head, yellow bill”. Finally, we
visualize the predicted attributes for clean and adversarial
images using a pre-trained Faster RCNN model.
Attribute prediction. We employ structured joint embed-
dings (SJE) [2] to predict attributes in an image. Given in-
put image features θ(xn) ∈ X and output class embedding
φ(yn) ∈ Y from the sample set S = {(θ(xn), φ(yn), n =
1...N} SJE learns a mapping f : X → Y by minimiz-
ing the empirical risk of the form 1N
∑N
n=1 ∆(yn, f(xn))
where ∆ : Y × Y → R estimates the cost of predicting
f(xn) when the true label is yn.
A compatibility function F : X × Y → R is defined
between input X and output Y space:
F (xn, yn;W ) = θ(xn)
TWφ(yn) (3)
where W is a matrix of dimension D × E where D is
the dimension of input and E is the dimension of output
embedding. It denotes the model parameters to be learned
by ranking the correct class higher than the other classes:
1
N
N∑
n=1
max
y∈Y
{0, l(xn, yn, y)} (4)
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Figure 3: Our interpretable attribute prediction-grounding model. After adversarial attack or adversarial training step, image
features of both clean θ(xn) and adversarial images θ(xˆ) are extracted using Resnet and mapped into attribute space φ(y) by
learning the compatibility function F (xn, yn;W ) between image features and class attributes. Finally, attributes predicted by
SJEAqxn,yn are grounded by matching them with attributes predicted by Faster RCNN Ajxn for clean and adversarial images.
where l(xn, yn, y) is the pairwise ranking loss:
∆(yn, y) + θ(xn)
TWφ(yn)− θ(xn)TWφ(y) (5)
We optimize W with SGD by sampling (xn, y) and search-
ing for the highest ranked class yn. If the sampled label y is
not the correct label then the weights are updated using:
W t = W t−1 + ηtθ(xn)[φ(yn)− φ(y)] T (6)
where η is the learning rate and θ(xn)W gives the predicted
attributes for image xn. The image is assigned to the label
of the nearest per-class output embedding φ(yn).
Attribute grounding. In our final step, we ground the pre-
dicted attributes on to the input images using a pre-trained
Faster RCNN network and visualize them as in [4]. The
pre-trained Faster RCNN model F(xn) predicts bounding
boxes denoted by bj . For each object bounding box it pre-
dicts the class Yj as well as the attribute Aj [3].
bj ,Aj ,Yj = F(xn) (7)
The most discriminative attributes predicted by SJE are
selected based on the criteria that they change the most
when the image is perturbed with noise. Then we look up
for these attributes Aqxn,yn ,Apxˆn,y in attributes predicted by
Faster RCNN for each bounding box Ajxn ,A
j
xˆn
and when
the attributes predicted by SJE and Faster RCNN match i.e.
Aqxn,yn = Ajxn , Apxˆn,y = A
j
xˆn
we ground them on their re-
spective clean and adversarial images. Where, q and p are
the indexes of the attributes predicted by SJE which change
the most when perturbed with adversarial noise.
4. Experiments
In this section, we perform experiments on three differ-
ent datasets and analyze model performance for clean as
well as adversarial images. Finally, we present quantitative
as well as qualitative analysis using attributes for both tar-
geted and untargeted attacks.
Datasets. We experiment on three datasets, i.e. Animals
with Attributes 2 (AwA) [23], Large attribute (LAD) [50]
and Caltech UCSD Birds (CUB) [46]. AwA contains 37322
images (22206 train / 5599 val / 9517 test) with 50 classes
and 85 attributes per class. LAD has 78017 images (40957
train / 13653 val / 23407 test) with 230 classes and 359 at-
tributes per class. CUB consists of 11,788 images (5395
train / 599 val / 5794 test) belonging to 200 fine-grained
categories of birds with 312 attributes per class.
Image Features and Adversarial Examples. We extract
image features and generate adversarial images using fine-
tuned Resnet-152. Our untargeted and targeted attacks us-
ing iterative fast gradient sign method with epsilon  values
0.01, 0.06 and 0.12 and l∞ norm as a similarity measure
between clean input and the generated adversarial example.
We performed targeted attacks under average case scenario
where we selected the target class randomly from labels [6].
As for adversarial training, we repeatedly computed
the adversarial examples while training and fine-tuned the
Resnet-152 to minimize the loss on these examples. We
generated adversarial examples using projected gradient de-
scent method which is a multi-step variant of FGSM with
epsilon  values 0.01, 0.06 and 0.12 respectively for adver-
sarial training as in [25].
Attribute Prediction and Grounding. Our per-class at-
tribute vectors come with the dataset and are annotated
manually. At test time the image features are projected onto
the attribute space and the image is assigned with the label
of the nearest ground truth attribute vector.
The predicted attributes are grounded by using Faster-
RCNN pre-trained on Visual Genome Dataset since we do
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Figure 4: Comparing the accuracy of the non explainable Softmax classifier and the explainable SJE classifier for clean and
adversarially perturbed samples. We evaluate both classifiers on clean xn and adversarial images with no adversarial training
xˆn and the same with adversarial training xn (AT) and xˆn (AT) respectively.
not have ground truth part bounding boxes for any of our
datasets. The Faster-RCNN model extracts the bounding
boxes using 1600 object and 400 attribute annotations. Each
bounding box is associated with an attribute followed by the
object, e.g. a brown bird.
4.1. Comparing Softmax and SJE for Classification
Here, we evaluate Softmax and SJE classifiers in terms
of the classification accuracy on both clean and adversar-
ial images generated with untargeted and targeted attacks
for all three datasets. Since SJE model is a more explain-
able classifier, e.g. predicts attributes, compared to softmax,
e.g. predicts directly the class label, it is important to see if
there is any significant drop in accuracy. Note that we are
not attacking the SJE network directly but we are applying
black box attacks on SJE. Similarly, the adversarial training
is also performed on Softmax classifier and then the features
extracted from this model are used for training SJE.
We observe from our results with targeted and untargeted
IFGSM attacks in Figure 4 that SJE and Softmax accuracies
are on par for clean images on AWA dataset, SJE accuracy
is slightly higher for LAD dataset and slightly lower for
CUB dataset (red curves). With untargeted adversarial at-
tacks, SJE works slightly better for AWA and LAD datasets
and significantly better for CUB dataset i.e. ≈ 30% for
 = 0.025 (blue curves). However, with targeted attacks
for AWA and LAD datasets, SJE accuracy is slightly lower
than Softmax but the difference is not significant and is sig-
nificantly better for CUB dataset (blue curves). This shows
that while softmax classifier works slightly better on clean
images, SJE works significantly better especially when the
perturbation is small and the dataset is fine-grained with
well-defined attributes. This shows that when the image is
perturbed, by predicting attributes the model not only pro-
vides an explanation to the user but also the class predic-
tions are more accurate.
In addition, for targeted vs untargeted attacks, the ac-
curacy for targeted attacks does not decrease as much as
with untargeted attacks on all the three datasets. The rea-
son behind lack in the drop of accuracy for targeted attacks
is that in targeted attacks we randomly target the images
into wrong class which could be very far from its ground
truth hence it becomes difficult to misclassify into targeted
class as compared to untargeted attacks where the image
gets misclassified into the nearest wrong class. Although
the drop in accuracy for untargeted attacks is higher than
targeted attacks (blue curves), but then the improvement in
accuracy for untargeted is also high which leads to almost
same adversarially robust accuracy for both targeted and un-
targeted attacks (purple curves).
Our evaluation with and without adversarial training
shows that the classification accuracy improves for adver-
sarial images when adversarial training is used. For exam-
ple for AWA the accuracy improved from ≈ 5% to ≈ 83%
for untargeted attack with  = 0.12. However, the accu-
racy for clean images dropped e.g. for AWA the accuracy
dropped from ≈ 93% to ≈ 89% for untargeted attack with
 = 0.12 (green curves). Overall we observe with both
targeted and untargeted attacks that SJE is more robust to
the adversarial attacks as compared to Softmax (dotted blue
curves). Moreover, SJE results improve significantly for ad-
versarial examples as compared to Softmax with adversarial
training (dotted purple curves).
4.2. Quantifying Effect of Predicted Attributes
Our aim is to analyze (1) the predicted attributes of the
clean images classified correctly Zn,yn , and adversarial im-
ages misclassified Zˆn,y without adversarial training (2) pre-
dicted attributes of the adversarial images classified cor-
rectly ZˆATn,yn and classified incorrectly Zˆ
AT
n,y with adversarial
training. Note that, the correct ground truth class attribute
is referred to as φ(yn) and incorrect class attributes are as
φ(y).
We select top 20% of the attributes whose value changes
the most with adversarial perturbations considering dis-
tances between predicted attributes of clean and adversarial
images when they are correctly and incorrectly classified.
We contrast the Euclidean distance between predicted at-
tributes of (correctly classified) clean and (incorrectly clas-
sified) adversarial samples:
d1 = d{Zn,yn , Zˆn,y} =‖ Zn,yn − Zˆn,y ‖2 (8)
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Figure 5: Attribute distance plots for standard and robust learning frameworks. Standard learning framework plots are shown
for clean and adversarial image attributes and robust learning framework plots are shown only for adversarial image attributes
but for adversarial images misclassified with standard features and correctly classified with robust features.
with the Euclidean distance between the ground truth at-
tribute vector of the correct and incorrect classes:
d2 = d{φ(yn), φ(y)} =‖ φ(yn)− φ(y)) ‖2 (9)
and show the results in Figure 5 (a). We observe that for
AWA and LAD datasets the distances between the predicted
attributes for adversarial and clean images d1 are smaller
than the distances between the ground truth attributes of
clean and adversarial classes d2. This result shows that,
only a minimal change in attribute values towards the wrong
class can cause a misclassification. On the other hand, the
fine-grained CUB dataset behaves differently. The overlap
between d1 and d2 distributions shows that the images from
fine-grained classes are more susceptible to adversarial at-
tacks and hence their attributes change significantly com-
pared to images of coarse categories.
Contrasting the distances between the predicted at-
tributes for the adversarial image Zˆn,y and the ground truth
attribute φ(y) for the adversarial class:
d1 = d{Zˆn,y, φ(y)} =‖ Zˆn,y − φ(y) ‖2 (10)
with the distance between the predicted attribute for adver-
sarial image Zˆn,y and the ground truth attribute φ(yn) for
the correct class:
d2 = d{Zˆn,y, φ(yn)} =‖ Zˆn,y − φ(yn) ‖2 (11)
we obtain results in Figure 5 (c). We observe that, for
most of the images, the distance between the adversarial
image attribute and the correct class attribute d2 is higher
than the distance between adversarial image attribute and
the wrongly classified class d1. This result shows us that,
adversarial images are misclassified because the adversar-
ial image attributes are close to the incorrect class attributes
whereas they are far away from the correct class attributes.
Our results comparing the distances between the pre-
dicted attributes of the adversarial images that are classified
correctly with the help of adversarial training ZˆATn,yn and in-
correctly without adversarial training Zˆn,y:
d1 = d{ZˆATn,yn , Zˆn,y} =‖ ZˆATn,yn − Zˆn,y ‖2 (12)
with the distances between the ground truth target class at-
tributes φ(yn) and ground truth wrong class attributes φ(y):
d2 = d{φ(yn), φ(y)} =‖ φ(yn)− φ(y)) ‖2 (13)
are shown in Figure 5 (b). We observe that the overall be-
havior of the predicted attributes for that adversarial images
with adversarial training and without adversarial training is
similar to the behavior seen in Figure 5 (a) for clean and
adversarial images. This shows that the adversarial images
with adversarial training behave like clean images, i.e. pre-
dicted attributes for the adversarial images with adversarial
training become closer to their ground truth correct class.
We compare the distances between the predicted at-
tributes for the incorrectly classified adversarial image ZˆATn,y
and the ground truth attribute φ(y) of the adversarial class:
d1 = d{ZˆATn,y , φ(y)} =‖ ZˆATn,y − φ(y) ‖2 (14)
with the distance between the predicted attribute for adver-
sarial image ZˆATn,y and the ground truth attribute φ(yn) for
the correct class:
d2 = d{ZˆATn,y , φ(yn)} =‖ ZˆATn,y − φ(yn) ‖2 (15)
when the classifier is trained with adversarial training. From
the results in Figure 5 (d) we observe a similar behavior as
the results presented in Figure 5 (c). This shows adversarial
images misclassified with adversarial training behaves like
adversarial images misclassified without it.
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Figure 6: Qualitative analysis for untargeted/targeted attacks and adversarial training on CUB. The attributes ranked by
importance for the classification decision are shown below the images. The grounded attributes are color coded for visibility
(the ones in gray could not be grounded). The attributes for clean images (and adversarial images with adversarial training)
are related to correct classes whereas the ones predicted for adversarial images change towards incorrect classes.
4.3. Grounding Predicted Attributes
To qualitatively analyse the predicted attributes, we
ground them on clean and adversarial images. We select
our images among the ones that are correctly classified
when clean and incorrectly classified when adversarially
perturbed. For clean images (or adversarial images with
adversarial training), we select the most discriminative at-
tributes based on:
q = argmax
i
(Zin,yn − φ(yi)) (16)
for adversarial images we select them based on:
p = argmax
i
(Zˆin,y − φ(yin)). (17)
We evaluate 50 attributes that change their value the most
for CUB, 50 attributes for AWA, and 100 attributes for LAD
dataset. We match the selected attributes with the attributes
predicted by F st r RCNN to ground them on the images.
Qualitative Results in CUB. We perform an analysis with
untargeted and targeted IFGSM attacks as well as adversar-
ial training on the fine-grained CUB dataset.
In untargeted attacks (results at the top row of Figure 6),
the image gets misclassified into the nearest incorrect class.
We observe that the most important attributes for the clean
images are localized accurately; however, for adversarial
images misclassifications occur. Those attributes which are
common among both clean and adversarial classes are lo-
calized correctly on the adversarial images; however, the
attributes which are not related to the correct class, i.e. the
ones that are related to the wrong cla s can not get grounded
as there is no visual evidence that supports the presence
of these attributes. For example “brown wing, long wing,
long tail” attributes are common in both classes; hence, they
are present both in the clean image and the adversarial im-
age. On the other hand, has a brown color and a multi-
colored breast which are evidences that are not present in
the adversarial image. Hence, they can not get grounded.
Similarly, in the second example none of the attributes are
grounded. This is beca se the evidence for those attributes
are not present in the image. In the third example, common
attributes are localized but “brown throat, spotted wing” are
not localized for the same reasons.
In targeted attacks (results in the middle row of Figure 6)
the images are forced to g t missclassified into a randomly
selected class. So, the images get missclassified into classes
that do not share many common attributes. Our first vi-
sualizations show that none of the attributes of the adver-
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Figure 7: Qualitative analysis for untargeted attacks on AWA and LAD. The attributes are ranked by importance for the
classification decision, the grounded attributes are color coded for visibility (the ones in gray could not be grounded).
sary class were visible in the adversarial example, hence,
those attributes could not get grounded. In other words, pre-
dicted adversarial image attributes are in accordance with
the wrong class attributes but different from the clean im-
age so none of the attribute got localized. For the second
image, black tail is a common property between the clean
image class and the adversary however, this is not the most
discriminating property. One of the most discriminating
properties such as “solid back” did not get localized since
there is no visual evidence that supports the presence of this
attribute in clean image. Similarly, in the third example,
we observe that the most discriminating property is “striped
wing” but it did not get localized in the adversarial image
for the same reason.
Finally, our analysis with correctly classified images due
to adversarial training shows that adversarial images with
adversarial training behave like clean images also visually.
In last row of Figure 6, we observe that the attributes of
adversarial image without adversarial training are closer to
the adversarial class attributes. However, the grounded at-
tributes of adversarial image with adversarial training are
closer to its ground truth class. For instance, the first ex-
ample contains a “blue head” and a “black wing” whereas
one of the most discriminating properties of the correct class
“blue head” is not relevant to the adversarial class hence this
attribute is not predicted as the most relevant by our model
and hence our attribute grounder did not ground it.
Qualitative Results in AWA and LAD. Due to restricted
space, we provide results on AWA and LAD only with
images perturbed with untargeted attacks. Our results in
Figure 7 show that the grounded attributes on clean im-
ages conform the classification into the correct class while
the attributes grounded on adversarial images are common
among clean and adversarial images. For instance first
example of AWA “is black” attribute is common in both
classes so it is grounded on both images but “has claws” is
an important attribute for the adversarial class. As it is not
present in correct class, it is not grounded.
On the other hand, compared to misclassifications
caused by adversarial perturbations on CUB, as AWA and
LAD are coarse grained datasets, images do not necessar-
ily get misclassified into the most similar class. Therefore,
there is less overlap of attributes between correct and adver-
sarial classes, which is in accordance with our quantitative
results. Furthermore, the attributes for both datasets are not
highly structured as different objects can be distinguished
from each other with only a small number of attributes.
Our method grounds the common attributes. The second
example for LAD in Figure 7 shows that attributes such as
“red” and “green” are distinguishing for “strawberry” which
are correctly predicted and grounded. On the other hand,
“has nutlets” and “is big” are attributes distinguishing for
“Mango”; hence, they can not be grounded on the adversar-
ially perturbed strawberry image.
5. Conclusion
In this work, we proposed an attribute prediction and
grounding framework to explain why adversarial perturba-
tions cause misclassifications. Our model predicts class-
specific properties of the objects via ranking relevant class
attributes higher than irrelevant ones and grounds these at-
tributes on their respective images. Our analysis involved
images generated by targeted and untargeted attacks as well
as adversarial training. We showed quantitatively and qual-
itatively that predicted attributes for adversarial images are
relevant to the wrong class and to the correct class for clean
images justifying why adversarial images get misclassified.
We visually grounded these predicted attributes to show the
visible and missing evidence when a misclassification oc-
curs on three benchmark datasets.
8
References
[1] J. Adebayo, J. Gilmer, M. Muelly, I. Goodfellow,
M. Hardt, and B. Kim. Sanity checks for saliency
maps. In NeurIPS, 2018. 1, 2
[2] Z. Akata, S. Reed, D. Walter, H. Lee, and B. Schiele.
Evaluation of output embeddings for fine-grained im-
age classification. In CVPR. IEEE, 2015. 3
[3] P. Anderson, X. He, C. Buehler, D. Teney, M. John-
son, S. Gould, and L. Zhang. Bottom-up and top-down
attention for image captioning and visual question an-
swering. In CVPR, 2018. 4
[4] L. Anne Hendricks, R. Hu, T. Darrell, and Z. Akata.
Grounding visual explanations. In ECCV, 2018. 4
[5] N. Carlini, A. Athalye, N. Papernot, W. Brendel,
J. Rauber, D. Tsipras, I. Goodfellow, A. Madry, and
A. Kurakin. On evaluating adversarial robustness.
ICLR, 2019. 1
[6] N. Carlini and D. Wagner. Towards evaluating the ro-
bustness of neural networks. In SP. IEEE, 2017. 2,
4
[7] Y. Dong, H. Su, J. Zhu, and F. Bao. Towards inter-
pretable deep neural networks by leveraging adversar-
ial examples. arXiv, 2017. 1, 2
[8] Y. Dong, H. Su, J. Zhu, and B. Zhang. Improving
interpretability of deep neural networks with semantic
information. In CVPR, 2017. 2
[9] M. Du, N. Liu, and X. Hu. Techniques for inter-
pretable machine learning. arXiv, 2018. 2
[10] M. Du, N. Liu, Q. Song, and X. Hu. Towards ex-
planation of dnn-based prediction with guided feature
inversion. In SIGKDD. ACM, 2018. 1
[11] V. Fischer, M. C. Kumar, J. H. Metzen, and T. Brox.
Adversarial examples for semantic image segmenta-
tion. ICLR, 2017. 2
[12] R. C. Fong and A. Vedaldi. Interpretable explanations
of black boxes by meaningful perturbation. arXiv,
2017. 1, 2
[13] A. Ghorbani, A. Abid, and J. Zou. Interpretation of
neural networks is fragile. arXiv, 2017. 2
[14] J. Gilmer, L. Metz, F. Faghri, S. S. Schoenholz,
M. Raghu, M. Wattenberg, and I. Goodfellow. Ad-
versarial spheres. arXiv, 2018. 1, 2
[15] I. Goodfellow, J. Shlens, and C. Szegedy. Explaining
and harnessing adversarial examples. In ICLR, 2015.
1, 2, 3
[16] S. Gu and L. Rigazio. Towards deep neural network
architectures robust to adversarial examples. arXiv,
2014. 2
[17] K. He, G. Gkioxari, P. Dolla´r, and R. Girshick. Mask
r-cnn. In ICCV, 2017. 1
[18] L. A. Hendricks, Z. Akata, M. Rohrbach, J. Donahue,
B. Schiele, and T. Darrell. Generating visual explana-
tions. In ECCV. Springer, 2016. 2
[19] L. Jiang, S. Liu, and C. Chen. Recent research ad-
vances on interactive machine learning. Journal of Vi-
sualization, 2018. 2
[20] J. Kos, I. Fischer, and D. Song. Adversarial examples
for generative models. In SPW. IEEE, 2018. 2
[21] A. Krizhevsky, I. Sutskever, and G. E. Hinton. Im-
agenet classification with deep convolutional neural
networks. In NeurIPS, 2012. 1
[22] A. Kurakin, I. Goodfellow, and S. Bengio. Adversar-
ial examples in the physical world. ICLR workshop,
2017. 2, 3
[23] C. H. Lampert, H. Nickisch, and S. Harmeling. Learn-
ing to detect unseen object classes by between-class
attribute transfer. In CVPR. IEEE, 2009. 4
[24] Y.-C. Lin, Z.-W. Hong, Y.-H. Liao, M.-L. Shih, M.-Y.
Liu, and M. Sun. Tactics of adversarial attack on deep
reinforcement learning agents. IJCAI, 2017. 2
[25] A. Madry, A. Makelov, L. Schmidt, D. Tsipras, and
A. Vladu. Towards deep learning models resistant to
adversarial attacks. ICLR, 2018. 4
[26] D. Meng and H. Chen. Magnet: a two-pronged de-
fense against adversarial examples. In SIGSAC. ACM,
2017. 1, 2
[27] J. H. Metzen, T. Genewein, V. Fischer, and
B. Bischoff. On detecting adversarial perturbations.
ICLR, 2017. 1, 2
[28] T. Miyato, S.-i. Maeda, M. Koyama, K. Nakae, and
S. Ishii. Distributional smoothing with virtual adver-
sarial training. ICLR, 2016. 3
[29] S.-M. Moosavi-Dezfooli, A. Fawzi, and P. Frossard.
Deepfool: a simple and accurate method to fool deep
neural networks. In CVPR, 2016. 2
[30] S. M. Moosavi Dezfooli, A. Fawzi, F. Omar,
P. Frossard, and S. Soatto. Robustness of classifiers
to universal perturbations: A geometric perspective.
In ICLR, number CONF, 2018. 1
[31] N. Papernot, P. McDaniel, S. Jha, M. Fredrikson, Z. B.
Celik, and A. Swami. The limitations of deep learning
in adversarial settings. In EuroS&P. IEEE, 2016. 2
[32] D. H. Park, L. A. Hendricks, Z. Akata, B. Schiele,
T. Darrell, and M. Rohrbach. Multimodal explana-
tions: Justifying decisions and pointing to the evi-
dence. In CVPR, 2018. 2
9
[33] S. Ren, K. He, R. Girshick, and J. Sun. Faster r-cnn:
Towards real-time object detection with region pro-
posal networks. In NeurIPS, 2015. 1
[34] P. Samangouei, M. Kabkab, and R. Chellappa.
Defense-gan: Protecting classifiers against adversarial
attacks using generative models. ICLR, 2018. 2
[35] R. R. Selvaraju, M. Cogswell, A. Das, R. Vedantam,
D. Parikh, and D. Batra. Grad-cam: Visual explana-
tions from deep networks via gradient-based localiza-
tion. In ICCV, 2017. 1, 2
[36] S. Shen, G. Jin, K. Gao, and Y. Zhang. Ae-gan: adver-
sarial eliminating with gan. arXiv, 2017. 2
[37] D. Silver, J. Schrittwieser, K. Simonyan,
I. Antonoglou, A. Huang, A. Guez, T. Hubert,
L. Baker, M. Lai, A. Bolton, et al. Mastering the game
of go without human knowledge. Nature, 550(7676),
2017. 1
[38] K. Simonyan, A. Vedaldi, and A. Zisserman. Deep in-
side convolutional networks: Visualising image clas-
sification models and saliency maps. arXiv, 2013. 2
[39] D. Su, H. Zhang, H. Chen, J. Yi, P.-Y. Chen, and
Y. Gao. Is robustness the cost of accuracy?–a com-
prehensive study on the robustness of 18 deep image
classification models. In ECCV, 2018. 1
[40] J. Su, D. V. Vargas, and K. Sakurai. One pixel attack
for fooling deep neural networks. IEEE Transactions
on Evolutionary Computation, 2019. 2
[41] C. Szegedy, W. Zaremba, I. Sutskever, J. Bruna, D. Er-
han, I. Goodfellow, and R. Fergus. Intriguing proper-
ties of neural networks. ICLR, 2013. 1, 2
[42] P. Tabacof, J. Tavares, and E. Valle. Adversarial im-
ages for variational autoencoders. arXiv, 2016. 2
[43] G. Tao, S. Ma, Y. Liu, and X. Zhang. Attacks meet
interpretability: Attribute-steered detection of adver-
sarial samples. In NeurIPS, 2018. 1, 2
[44] F. Trame`r, A. Kurakin, N. Papernot, I. Goodfellow,
D. Boneh, and P. McDaniel. Ensemble adversarial
training: Attacks and defenses. ICLR, 2018. 1, 2
[45] D. Tsipras, S. Santurkar, L. Engstrom, A. Turner, and
A. Madry. Robustness may be at odds with accuracy.
stat, 1050, 2018. 1, 3
[46] C. Wah, S. Branson, P. Welinder, P. Perona, and
S. Belongie. The caltech-ucsd birds-200-2011 dataset.
2011. 4
[47] C. Xie, J. Wang, Z. Zhang, Y. Zhou, L. Xie, and
A. Yuille. Adversarial examples for semantic segmen-
tation and object detection. In CVPR, 2017. 2
[48] M. D. Zeiler and R. Fergus. Visualizing and under-
standing convolutional networks. In ECCV. Springer,
2014. 2
[49] X. Zhang, N. Wang, S. Ji, H. Shen, and T. Wang. In-
terpretable deep learning under fire. arXiv, 2018. 1,
2
[50] B. Zhao, Y. Fu, R. Liang, J. Wu, Y. Wang, and
Y. Wang. A large-scale attribute dataset for zero-shot
learning. arXiv, 2018. 4
[51] L. M. Zintgraf, T. S. Cohen, T. Adel, and M. Welling.
Visualizing deep neural network decisions: Prediction
difference analysis. ICLR, 2017. 2
10
